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Jurisdiction to tax cost after expiration of time for rehearing and after
appeal. The lower court may tax costs after an appeal is taken when to
do so will in no wise affect the merits of the controversy on appeal, and
will not interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.'
Appellate court should state grounds for reversal. While an appellate
court may not be required to state wherein the lower court has failed to
give legal effect to the evidence when it reverses on that ground, propriety
dictates that the court should do so,2
II
APPEALS
New appellate rules: Appeals from final and interlocutory orders - Law
and Equity- Only common law certiorari left. No longer do we have
interlocutory appeals in "the nature of certiorari" as provided by former
*Professor, University Miami School of Law; Justice of the Supreme Court (retired).
1. Winters v. Parks, 91 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1956).
2. Holland v. Cross, 89 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1956).
541
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
supreme court rule 14. Rule 4.2 of the Florida Appellate Rules effective
July I, 1957, provides:
Interlocutory Appeals. Appeals from interlocutory orders or decrees
in equity, orders or decrees entered after final decree, and orders at
common law relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person, may
be prosecuted in accordance with this rule; provided that nothing
contained in this rule shall preclude the review of such orders and
decrees on appeal from the final decree in the cause.
This clearly permits interlocutory appeals in equity from orders and
decrees before or after final decree. The rule enlarges review of interlocutory
orders in law actions by permitting appeals from "orders at common law
relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person."
When review of jurisdiction of the subject matter is to be questioned
in an action at law, the litigant must await final judgment or proceed by
way of common law prohibition or mandamus. In the federal system the
litigant may procure preliminary consideration of such questions of juris-
diction by motion after docketing a partial record of the case in the court
of appeals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 75(j) which provides:
Record for Preliminary I-fearing in Appellate Court. If, prior to the
time the complete record on appeal is settled and certified as herein
provided, a party desires to docket the appeal in order to make in
the appellate court a motion for dismissal, for a stay pending appeal,
for additional security on the bond on appeal or on the supersedeas
bond, or for any intermediate order, the clerk of the district court
at his request shall certify and transmit to the appellate court a copy
of such portion of the record or proceedings below as is needed for
that purpose.
He then moves the court of appeals for an order of prohibition or
mandamus. The jurisdiction of a federal court of appeals to grant prohi-
bition or mandamus is based on Title 28 U.S.C., section 1651, which reads:
Writs.
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.
Section (b) of article V of the Florida Constitution, recently adopted,
provides:
The supreme court may issue all writs necessary or proper to
the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
The language of article V of the constitution is not the same as section
1651 of the U. S. Code. However, it is broad enough to permit the state
practice to follow the federal practice. This is particularly so by reason
of section 3 of article V which provides:
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The practice and procedure of all courts shall be governed by
rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
Split judgment and split appeals permitted on a single claim against
multiple parties. In a suit on one claim against multiple parties, one of
whom was the maker and the other the endorser of a promissory note,
the court entered separate judgments at different times; held, the time
for appeal commenced to run on each judgment from the date of its
entry.3
It appears that when a final judgment or decree is entered, the
party against whom it is entered may not await a final determination as
to all the parties and then appeal. What is and what is not a final judgment
or decree in effect is often difficult to determine.
As a signal. for when the time for appeal has commenced to run, in
some cases it has been provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
54(b), that when there are multiple claims (to be distinguished from
multiple parties) that one or more of the claims may be terminated by
the trial court when the court directs the entry of a final judgment, "upon
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
express direction for the entry of judgment." However, since the above rule
applies only to multiple claims, it would not be applicable to cases of
the category in which the Fellowship Foundation case3f falls, a single claim
against multiple parties. The rule is applicable only when there are multiple
claims against one or more parties.
Good rules save labor for the court and likewise benefit the litigants
and their attorneys. Much confusion has existed for a long time as to
what is a final judgment or decree for appellate purposes. This confusion
has arisen generally under varying circumstances where there are multiple
parties and multiple claims, single parties and multiple claims, single claims
and multiple parties, and where the liability is joint and where the liability
is severable. For appellant purposes, appeals have been dismissed for the
lack of finality, although the judgments entered appeared to be final in
form and substance. These judgments were found not to be final until
the case was adjudicated as to all the parties. However, in other cases,
where the judgments and decrees were entered as final in form and substance
and the aggrieved parties delayed the appeal until final adjudication as to
all the parties, the appeals were dismissed as being too late.
In Florida we have no rule corresponding to Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which serves to dispatch some cases for appellate
purposes when properly "earmarked" as final. Federal Rule 54(b) relates only
3. Fellowship Foundation Inc. v. Soule, 85 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1956). Compare
Sohwenak v. Jacobs, 169 Fla. 33, 33 So.2d 592 (1948); Chisholm v. Coconut Grove
Excb. Bank, 144 Fla. 770, 198 So. 703 (1940); Ropes v. Lansing, 46 Fla. 231, 35 So.
863 (1903).
3a. Ibid.
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to multiple claims without regard to whether there are multiple parties or
only one party to the action.
The last report of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States dated Octo-
ber, 1955, recommended, inter alia, that rule 54(b) be amended. None of the
recommendations were adopted and the committee was discharged. If we
should adopt the committee's proposed amendment to rule 54(b), it
doubtless would be a trouble saver.
The proposed amendnent reads as follows:
Rule 54. JUDGMENTS; CosTs
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple
parties. When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are
involved is presented in an action, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabili-
ties of less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of de-
cision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judg-
ment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
The committee note to the foregoing suggestion reads:
The Committee has previously noted scholarly suggestions
that existing Rule 54(b) does not permit appeal, even with the
requisite finding by the trial judge, from an order dismissing
an action as to less than all the parties jointly suing or being
sued, and that an amendment should be made to permit appeal
in such a situation 4
Florida. Appeals not permitted from order denying motion for judgment
n.o.v, after an appeal front an order granting an alternative motion for a
new trial. The case of Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Boone5 involves a
situation where after an adverse verdict the defendant-appellant filed a
timely motion for judgment n.o.v. and an alternative motion for a new
trial, as permitted by Rule 2.7 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure which
follows Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial judge
granted the new trial and denied judgment n.o.v. whereupon plaintiff
appealed from the order granting a new trial and the defendant-railroad
* 4. Moore, FEDERAL PRACT-ICE, Vol. V 6 Par. 43.34(2d) (2d ed. 1953); Note 62
Y.LE L.J. 263, 271, 232 (1953); c. note: 28 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 203 (1953).
5. 85 So.2d 834 (Fia. 1956).
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appealed from the order denying the motion for judgment n.o.v. The appeals
were separate and no effort was made to cross-assign errors.
The supreme court dismissed the appeal of the defendant upon the
ground that the drder granting the new trial has the effect, ipso facto, of
vacating the judgment, hence there was no judgment from which plaintiff
could appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.
Federal courts. Cross-appeals or cross-assignment of errors, when not
permitted as an original appeal and when not authorized by statute. In the
the federal system a few of the courts of appeals have honored cross-appeals
and cross-assignments of error addressed to orders from which an original
appeal is not expressly allowed by statute, under circumstances similar to
the Atlantic Coast Line case.
In Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R. Co." after a defendant's motion for a
directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence was denied, a verdict
was rendered adverse to the defendant. Thereupon the defendant filed a
timely motion for judgment n.o.v., under Rule 50(b) Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and, if that was not granted, a motion for new trial on thc
ground that the verdict was agains the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
The motion for judgment n.o.v. was granted, but in denying the motion
for a new trial, the trial judge refused to invoke any discretion and denied
the motion for a new trial. He did not follow the suggestion found in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,7 of conditionally passing on the
motion for a new trial. Thereupon the plaintiff appealed and the defendant,
notwithstanding a favorable judgment, filed a cross-appeal, based on the
ground that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial in the
event that the judgment n.o.v, was reversed. The court of appeals reversed
the judgment n.o.v. and also the order denying the alternative motion for a
new trial, holding that the court of appeals did not have power to direct
a new trial, as that was the primary function of the trial court, see Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,s and stated that "The full discretion
vested in the trial judge not having been exercised, we will remand the
case with directions to the judge to grant a new trial * * * if he con-
tinues to think the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence."
In Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Co.,0 in an action for personal injuries
after the rendition of an adverse verdict, the defendant filed a timely
motion for judgment n.o.v. and weeks later the trial judge, in passing on
the motion for judgment no.v., granted a new trial in the absence of a
motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the
greater weight of the evidence ". . . and the construction of Rule 50(b)
6. 175 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1949).
7. 311 U.S. 234 (1940).
S. Ibid.
9. 243 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as found in Cone v. West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co.,10 when construing the "either" "or" clause of 50(b).
From an order granting a new trial, which orders are not made
appealable under federal law, the plaintiff appealed. The Court justified
the review of the order granting a new trial by a footnote stating "an order
granting a new trial is not ordinarily reviewable. But where as in the
case at bar, such an order exceeds the power of the court it may be
reviewed notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.""1
In construing the power of the trial court to grant a new trial without a
motion therefor when in passing on a motion for judgment n.o.v. the Court in
the Jackson case supra stated:
When a trial court concludes that a proper basis exists for
granting a timely, well-grounded motion for judgment n.o.v.,
it has a discretion to grant the lesser relief and to order a new
trial instead if justice would thereby better be served. This is so
even though no motion for a new trial has been filed, and even
though 10 days have elapsed since the entry of judgment. This
discretion to grant the lesser relief, however, comes into being
only when the record is such that the entry of judgment n.o.v.
would be warranted. The court may then give the party against whom
judgment n.o.v. could be entered another opportunity to supply
those defects in the record which would warrant the harsher
remedy of an adverse final judgment.
On review the court of Appeals reversed the lower court and did
not follow the reasoning of the lower court, but, see the opinion of the
dissenting judge, which dissenting opinion was followed in Shaw v. Hines
Lumber Co., 249 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1957). The Shaw case removed the
conditions of "only" clause in the Jackson case as quoted supra, holding a
new trial could be granted upon a hearing of a timely motion for judgment
n.o.v, in the absence of a motion for new trial.
Prepayment of cost by plaintiff required of plaintiff-appellant; not
jurisdictional. In the case of O'Connell v. Mason12 the costs assessed against
the plaintiff-appellant were $1,750.75 and he appealed without having paid
the costs. The court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal on
that ground. Section 59.09 Florida Statutes 1955 provides:
Payment of costs by plaintiff.-No appeal may be taken by the
original plaintiff in any suit or proceeding until he shall pay all
costs which have accrued, in or about the suit, up to the time
the appeal is taken.
10. 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
11. Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, 671 (1886); Fried v. McGrath, 133 F.2d
350 (1942).
12. 93 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1956).
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Former supreme court rule 29 and present appellate court rule 3.2(f)
provide:
Payment of costs by original plaintiff. No appeal may be taken
by the original plaintiff in any suit or proceeding until he shall
have first paid all costs that have accrued in or about the suit,
and have been specifically taxed against him, up to the time the
appeal is taken; provided, that nothing contained herein shall re-
quire the prepayment of costs by the original plaintiff when he
he has assigned as error the taxation of costs and has superseded
the order, judgment or decree specifically taxing the same.'
The court in the O'Connell case approved Berg v. New York Life Ins.
Co.,14 to the effect that prepayment was not a jurisdictional condition
precedent.
Prepayment of cost obviated by new constitutional amendment to
article V. Since the adoption of this amendment of the constitution effective
July 1, 1957 it seems evident that in the event of an appeal to the supreme
court or to any of the courts of appeals that any statute or rule such
as section 59.09 of the Florida Statutes or present appellate court rule
3.2(f) would be in conflict with the following constitutional provisions per-
mitting appeals to such courts as a matter of right.
Appeals to the supreme court. Section 4(b) of article V provides
as follows:
(b) Jurisdiction. Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly
to the supreme court, as a matter of right only from judgments
imposing the death penalty, from final judgments or decrees directly
passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or
treaty, or construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal
constitution, and from final judgments or decrees in proceedings
for the validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness.
Appeals to the courts of appeals. Section 5(c) of article V provides
as follows:
Sc) Jurisdiction. Appeals from trial courts in each appellate
istrict, and from final orders or decrees of county judge's courts
pertaining to probate matters or to estates and interests of minors
and incompetents, may be taken to the court of appeal of such
district, as a matter of right, from all final judgments or decrees
except those from which appeals may be taken direct to supreme
court or to a circuit court.
It is fundamental that rights unqualifiedly and unconditionally granted
or reserved by the constitution may not be impaired, abridged or curtailed
by the legislature or by rules of the court.
13. For previous cases noted on this point see 10 MIAMt L.Q. 458 (1956).
14. 81 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1956).
1958]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Joinder in appeal. The supreme court decision of Villaneuva v. Shayne
Inc.'5 arouses one's curiosity as to whether appellate rule 3.11(b) relating
to "joinder in appeal" serves any useful purpose. Villaneuva sued Shayne
Inc. and Schweida; he obtained a judgment against Shayne Inc. and a
dismissal was entered in favor of Schweida. Thereupon Shayne Inc. appealed
from the judgment whereupon plaintiff-appellee Villaneuva filed a paper
entitled a "joinder in appeal" to the appeal taken by Shayne Inc. stating
that "the plaintiff appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the defendant
Elva I. Schveida, bearing date of January 30, 1957." The court granted
Schweida's motion to dismiss Villaneuva's. "joinder in appeal" because
Villaneuva was the original plaintiff and had not paid the costs taxed
against him in favor of Schweida based on section 59.09 of the Florida
Statutes which prescribes that no appeal shall be taken by an original plaintiff
until he shal lhave paid such cost. The decision was grounded on the
premise that to hold otherwise would permit the plaintiff-appellee to
accomplish by indirection what he could not do directly by taking a cross-
appeal. The decision clearly demonstrates that appellate rule 3.11 (b) (1957)
on "joinder on appeal" serves no useful purpose, but on the contrary,
serves well to burden the appellate courts. The simple way to join in an
appeal with another is to sign where the other signed, like the signing of a
joint provision note by two or more persons. If one party has already taken
an appeal and another wishes to do likewise, then the simple process is to
just take an appeal or cross-appeal; such is the generally accepted practice.
The court cannot do much about section 59.09 of the Florida Statutes
since it is substantive but of doubtful merit. It need not dignify its doubtful
merit by incorporating it into the rules. A procedural rule that will give
an appellee as much protection as one is entitled to would be to amend
appellate rule 3.5(b) to read:
(b) Cross-assignments of Errors by Appellee. Within the time
allowed for him to serve a designation for. additional matters for
the record on appeal, an appellee may serve and file cross-assign-
ments - of errors, which shall be stated according to the facts
and circumstances as they occurred, and which shall have the
force and effect of a cross-appeal if an appeal of such matter was
permitted by law at 'the time of the original appeal or at the
time of the serving or filing of the cross-assignment of errors, but
his failure to do so shall not prejudice any right on a subsequent
appeal allowed by law.
Should the foregoing amendment be made, then the troublesome
"joinder in appeal" rule 3.11 () could well be abolished.
15. 96 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1957).
[VOL. X1I
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RIGHT TO REvIEwv
Estoppel by accepting benefits of decree. In Weatherford v. Weather-
ford' two, but not all, of the husband's assignments of errors were based
on the error vel non of granting the wife a divorce. The wife moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the husband had accepted the
benefits of the final decree of divorce by remarrying. Thereupon the
husband abandoned these two grounds and the court recognized the merits
of the motion by quoting the following language:
In the case of McMullen v. Fort Pierce Financing & Construction
Co.,' 7 the court stated the general rule as follows:
It is a well-settled doctrine that where a party recovering a
judgment or decree accepts the benefits thereof, voluntarily and
knowing the facts, he is estopped to afterwards seek a reversal
of such judgment or decree on writ of error or appeal. His conduct




Intervention after final decree. The general rule is that it is too late
to apply for intervention after final decree. However, when the ends of
justice require it, such leave may be granted, and if an appeal has already
been taken such intervention may be permitted in the appellate court.18
Wags Transportation System, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So.2d 751
(Fla. 1956).
V
MAKING AND SAVING GROUNDS FOR REVIEwN
Questions preliminary to admission of evidence. Although there was
no proffer of testimony, where the lower court ruled that an attorney
was not competent to testify concerning transactions with deceased about
deceased's will competency of witness could be determined on appeal.
When point considered in absence of exception. W*Vhen jury instruction
is on the central issue of the case, the appellate court may consider it
under the general rule which allows appellate courts to notice plain
errors even though they were not propertly excepted to in the trial court.20
Failure to transfer to law side, not error unless requested. When
appellant failed to present for a ruling the propriety of transferring a
16. 91 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1956).
17. 108 Fla. 492, 495; 146 So. 567, 568 (1933).
18. Wags Transportation System, Inc. v. Miami Beach, 88 So.2d 7;1 (Fla. 1956).
19. Seeba v. Bowden, 86 So.2d 432 (Fla, 1956).
20. United States v. Shemell, 234 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957).
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case to the law side after equitable relief is denied, he has not made a
point for consideration in review on appeal from the final decree in equity.2 1
VI
PROCEDURE AND LIMrrAATIONS oF TIME FOR APPEAL
Timely petition for rehearing in equity tolls time for appeal. Gasque v.
Ball2" and Lauderdale-by-the-Sea Development Co. v. Lauderdale Surf &
Yacht Estate,28 are partially overruled, and justifiably so, by obiter dictum
contained in the decision of Canzer v. Ganzer,24 stating that a timely
petition for rehearing in equity cases will postpone the commencement of
the running of time for taking an appeal. In the Gasque case and the
Lauderdale case timely petitions for rehearing were filed and denied and
both cases held that the filing of the petition did not postpone the com-
mencement of the running of the time for taking an appeal from the final
decree.
in the Ganzer case an untimely petition for rehearing was filed and
denied, but the appeal was taken after the time allowed when calculated
from the time of entry of the final decree; hence the court dismissed
the appeal holding that the denial of an untimely petition for rehearing
did not postpone or toll the time for taking an appeal from the final
decree in equity. By way of dictum the court held that a timely petition
for rehearing would have the effect of postponing the commencement
of the running of the time for taking an appeal until the petition was
adjudicated. The Ganxer case leaves open the question of the effect of
granting an untimely petition for rehearing when done before the time
for appeal has expired and when no appeal has been taken. However, in
Brenner v. Geernter,25 the court referring to untimely petitions for re-
hearing, consistent with recognized law, in passing, suggested that if the
petition had been granted, though without the provisions of any statute
or rule, that the result may have been differen by the following:
.... the appellant should not be required to go to the expense and
trouble of filing an appeal which might be unnecessary if the
trial judge grants his motion for reconsideration of issues raised
by the original action.
Suggest court rule: rules of court serve to crystallize the doctrine of
courts and to inform the bar of the adopted doctrine in a way that makes
the ascertainment more certain and simple; otherwise the policy can only
be gleaned from the decisions, and decisions are rendered at different
periods under different circumstances. It has been suggested that rule
21. Wood v. Wilson, 84 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1955).
22. 71 Fla. 257, 71 So. 329 (1916).
23. 160 Fla. 929, 37 So.2d 364 (1948).
24. 84 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1956).
25. 90 So.2d 306 (Fa. 1956).
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3.2(b) of the new appellate court rules might be appropriately amended
to read as follows:
Suggested rule 3.2(b).
(b) Appeals: Tolling of time. The running of the time for appeal
is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the
rules of court permitting any of the orders hereinafter named and
the full time for appeal commences to run and is to be computed
from the entry of any of the following orders made upon a timely
motion:
(1) granting or denying a motion for judgment in accordance
with a motion for a directed verdict;
(2) granting or denying a motion for a new trial;
(3) denying a motion or petition for rehearing in a non-jury
matter;
(4) granting or denying a motion to amend an appealable order,
judgment or decree.
Note: of. Federal rules of civil procedure 73(a).
To make this amendment would tend to stabilize the law as presently
found in the decisions and tend to preclude further controversy or doubt,
and thereby serve both the bar and the bench. The time allowed for
taking an appeal by statute is substantive and not procedural. The taking
of an appeal is procedural.
Time for appeal begins to run though finality of decision is con-
tingently effective. In Brenner v. Gelernten,26 an appeal was taken from a
final judgment worded as follows:
That defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint be, and the
same is hereby granted, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend within
15 days from date, if they so desire. Otherwise, this cause shall
stand dismissed with costs assessed against the plaintiffs. (Emphasis
added.)
The plaintiffs did not amend but appealed after the expiration of
the "fifteen days." The appellecs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that appeal was not timely, and the motion was granted. The
appeal was timely if calculated from the expiration of the "fifteen days"
following the date of the judgment, but not timely if calculated from
the date of the judgment. The court did not hold that dismissal in the
lower court was incomplete as to finality when the order was entered,
nor suspended for the duration of the "fifteen days" allowed for leave
to amend; neither did it hold that the dismissal was of conditional pros-
pective legal effect. The question presented by the case was: Did the time
26. Ibid.
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for appeal commence to run from the date 6f the order, or from the
day that dismissal was effective? The order was a conditional dismissal, i.e.
the dismissal was to be effective upon the contingency of the plaintiffs
not amending within fifteen days. The dismissal was not absolute upon
the entry of the order, but only contingently absolute.
It has been held that the granting of a motion to dismiss a complaint
with leave to amend is interlocutory, and not a final judgment or decree,
until the time allowed for amendment has expired.27 In Sumerall v. Florida
Tar & Creosote Corp.,28 an appeal was taken from an order sustaining a
motion to dismiss with leave to amend and the appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the order was interlocutory and not a final judgment.
When time for taking an appeal from circuit court is not tolled
by filing petition for rehearing. When the circuit court has rendered a
judgment on appeal from the probate court, the filing of a petition for
rehearing, being anamolous, does not toll or postpone the commencement
or running of time for appeal to the supreme court when the petition is
denied. In re Lee's Estate,-", citing as authority Corunne v. Saffan. : If the
petition had been granted before the time for appeal had expired and
before a timely appeal the decision would likely have been different.
In Law actions time for appeal not extended by filing of petitions for
rehearing after entry of summary judgment. The filing of a petition for
rehearing after the entry of an adverse summary judgment is an anamolons
proceedings and has no effect on the commencement or the running of
the time allowed for taking an appeal. In the Counne ease supra, the
appeal from the summary judgment was dismissed because it was not talen
within the time allowed by statute, which is a jurisdictional requirement
which could not be waived. In this case the petition for rehearing was denied.
The court observed that Weisberg v. Pert," held that "there is no pro-
vision in our rules or statutes for attacking a summary judgment by petition
for rehearing." But it does not necessarily follow that such petition
could not be granted and the judgment vacated, if the time for appeal
has not expired and in the absence of an appeal taken. It is clear
however, that when such petition is simply denied, that the running
of the time for appeal is not affected thereby. The appeal was held not
taken until the notice of appeal was filed with the clerk and the service
of notice of appeal on the adversary was not sufficient to affect an appeal.
Counne v. Saffan 2 obviated by new appellate rules. The applica-
tion of the rle of law as pronounced in the Counne case has doubtless
27. Lykes Bros. Fla. Co. v. King, 125 Fla. 101, 169 So. 595 (1936).
28. 55 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1951).
29. 90 So.2d 290 (la. 1956).
30. 87 So.2d 586 -Fla. 1956).
31. 73 So.2d 56 (Ia. I04).
32. See note 30 suibra.
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been obviated by appellate rule 1.1 and rule 3.13, which are applicable
to the circuit courts. Rule 1.1 provides that "From their effective date they
shall govern all proceedings . . . in the circuit courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction" and rule 3.13 provides that "Unless further
time is allowed, rehearings must be applied for by petition in writing
within 15 days after the filing of the decision or order of the court."
Tardy docketing of appeal. A failure to docket an appeal by filing
the record on appeal within the time prescribed by the rules of the appellate
court does not "involve jurisdictional questions but have to do with pro-
cedural steps" subject to such action as the appellate court deems appro-
priate. : The foregoing holding conforms to the law of appeals as stated
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 73(a) which provides:
A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district
court a notice of appeal. Failure of the appellant to take any further
steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed from does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such remedies
as are specified in this rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal.
VII
SUPERSEDEAS OR STAY
Supersedeas discretionary. In re Jaeckels Estate, the court reaffirmeu
the holding in All Florida Surety Co. v. Coker 4 to the effect that a party
is entitled to a srupersedeas as a matter of right only in the following
instances:
(1) in appeals from money judgments or decrees and
(2) certain judgments in probate and guardianship cases;
and that "the granting or denial of supersedeas rests in the discretion of the
court from whose judgment the appeal is taken and may be granted at any
time before the record on appeal is lodged in this court," subject to
review before the appellate court on motion.
When supersedeas is necessary. In the case of Austin v. Oviedo35
on petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the circuit court dismissing
an appeal from a conviction in a municipal court, a supersedeas bond was
held to be a statutory condition prerequisite to the right of appeal. The
opinion quoted the constitutional provision vesting the circuit court with
"appellate jurisdiction" in such cases. Section 11 of article V of the con-
stitution provided ". . . . They shall have final appellate jurisdiction . . .
of judgments and sentences of Mayor's Court . . . ." and also fully quoted
33. In re Jacekets Estate, 92 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1957).
34. 79 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955).
35. 92 So2d 648 (Fla. 1957).
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section 932.51(16) Florida Statutes specifying that an appellant on appeal
from a conviction in a municipal court "shall enter into a bond in double
the amount of the fine * * *" and that "When the bond is entered into
and filed with the clerk of the circuit court, it shall operate as a super-
sedeas. * * *" The case is unique in that a circumstance rarely exists
where a superseadeas is held to be a prerequisite to the right of appeal,




Necessity of assignment of errors. Assignment of error must relate
to judicial acts; after entry of appeal, assignments of error are indispensable
at all stages and the appellate court will not review the trial court's
judgment and will dismiss appeal therefrom, in absence of an assignment
of error. 16
Record on appeal must support assignment of error. An assignment
of error must be supported in point of fact by record on appeal. Redditt
v. States" and in the case of Vaughn v. Smith,38 the court instead of merely
rendering a memorandum opinion, affirmed the decision of the lower
court and clarified its opsition in respect to assignment of errors as follows:
A trial judge can be reversed only for errors presented by the
assignments. Red Top Cab 6 Baggage Co. v. Dormer, 159 Fla. 538,
32 So.2d 321. The very nature of the pleading in court of review
requires a proper assignment of error. St. Andrews Bay Lumber Co.
v. Bernard, 106 Fla. 235, 143 So. 160. The function of an assign-
ment of error is to point out the specific error claimed to have
been committed by the court below in order that the reviewing
court and opposing counsel may see on. what point the appellant
seeks reversal, and to limit argument and review to such point.
A point made that is not based on or shown by the brief to be
within the scope of some quoted assignment is futile and will be
considered as moot."D
Necessity of assignment of error. Where action of trial court in striking
portion of appellant's answer was not assigned as error, it was not properly
before reviewing court. Dicks v. Colonial Finance Corp.,40 and a point
which had not been raised by litigants could have no effect upon the out-
come of the appeal.4 '
36. Redditt v. State, 84 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1955).
37. Ibid.
38. 96 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1957).
39. See note 36 sutbra.
40. 85 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1956).
41. Larkin v. Jsavaris, 85 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1956).
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Assignment of errors, necessity of, in certiorari. In Moses v. R. H.
Wright & Son, Inc.42 the court pointed out that supreme court rule 22
provides that a petition for certiorari "shall contain a concise statement of
the cause and the reasons relied on for granting the writ" and, per Justice
Thomal, the word "reasons" was construed as corresponding to assignment
of errors.
43
Assignment of error, how stated in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Although the use of assignments of errors, designated as such, is
no longer the practice in the Supreme Court of the United States since
the adoption of its new rules in 1954, the function of an assignment of
error is accomplished in another way. That Court rules require that appellant
state in his appeal "the questions presented by the appeal, expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail,"
U. S. Supreme Court Rule 10; and requires that appellant shall also file a
jurisdiction statement showing "the questions presented by the appeal,
expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without un-
necessary detail. * * * The statement of the question presented will be
deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein."
Supreme Court Rule 15(c). The same matter is required to be contained in
a petition for certiorari. The U. S. Supreme Court Rules 23 and 40, among
other matters require that the brief of the appellant or petitioner shall
contain:
The questions presented for review, expressed in terms and circum-
stances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement
'of the question shall be deemed to include every subsidiary question
comprised therein.
Where formal assignments of errors are required, as in the 'state
practice, it would seem that they should meet the standards specified
in the foregoing rules as to questions presented, i.e. they, too, should be
expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case and when so done
the courts would construe the assignment "to include every subsidiary
question comprised therein."
IX
BRIEFS AND AssIl.-cwz NT OF ERROR
The new rules promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court effective
July 1, 1957 relative to briefs have discarded the language of the former
rules relating to "question involved" and have substituted a simple pro-
vision that is likely to be more conducive to the proper presentation of a
42. 90 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1956).
43. For necessity of an assignment of errors, now treated as "reasons for," in
certiorari cases see Weis v. Marcus, 160 Fla. 283, 34 So.2d 550 (1948); Schupler v.
Eastern Mtg. Co., 160 Fla. 2, 33 So.2d 586(1948); Leonard Bros. Trans. & Storage Co. v.
Douglass, 159 Fla. 510, 32 So.2d 156 (1946).
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case on review. '[ie provision of the new appellate rule 3.7 f(4) is as
follows:
Argument in support of the position of the appellant. This section
of the brief shall contain a division for each of the points involved.
Specific assignments of error from which the points argued arise
should be stated, and if any reference to the original record or
appendix is made, the page should be given.
The rule is clear in requiring that the assignment of error relied
on for reversal "shall be stated" with the point. To state does not merely
designate by number. To state is to copy it. No longer will the indolent
practice of the appellant stating in the brief that "This question is raised
by assignments of errors No. 3, 5, 11 and 13," meet the requirements of
the rule. As to refraining an assignment of error in the brief because
of the want of clarity."
It would seem that points might be stated somewhat as follows:
(I) Was It Error For The Trial Court To Charge The jury
That There Was No Specific Issue Properly Before It On The
Subject Of Appellec Newman's Personal Responsibility For
The Icy And Slippery Condition Of The Pathway?
(Copy supporting assignments of errors here)
(2) Was It Error For The Trial Court To Exclude Testimony To
Show That No Previous Accidents Had Occurred As A Result
Of Icy Conditions?
(Copy supporting assignments of errors here)
(3) Was Error Committed When Appellee's Counsel Was Allowed
To Ask Appellant's Medical Witness On Cross-Examination
Whether In His Opinion Good Advice Had Been Given To
Appellee By A Company Doctor To Return To Work After
He Returned From A Marine Hospital?
(Copy supporting assignments of errors here)
(4) Was The Verdict Excessive?
(Copy supporting assignments of errors here)
T o comply with appellate rule 3.7 f(4) each point must be argued
separately and each point must be supported by at least one assignment
of error stated; and an assignment of error should be stated according
to the facts and circumstances as it occurred and, if necessary for clarity,
refrained without departing from the substance of the original assignment.
44. See note 36 supra.
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New assignments of errors may not be made without leave of the appellate
court.
For purposes of review, court may rely solely on appendices. Appendices
to Brief. Required in Industrial Commission Cases. In Moses v. R. 1-I.
Wright & Son, Inc.45 it is clearly indicated that the court for the purpose of
review may rely solely on the appendices as contained in the briefs without
resort to the original record filed with the clerk. Per Justice Thornal, it is
stated: "The fact that Rule 16, subdivision 4, requires the Industrial Coin-
mission to transmit the original record to this Court does not relieve the
parties of the responsibility of attaching to their briefs the appendix required
by Rule 36, subdivision 7(e). This appendix is important for the simple
reason that it abstracts from the entire record those salient aspects of the
matter upon which the parties rely to sustain their respective positions in
this Court. Actually, unless there is a conflict between the appendices filed
by the opposing parties, there is no obligation under our rules for this
Court to examine any other portion of the record on appeal (capital cases
are the exception)."
Points or propositions relied on for reversal. In Graham v. State,"1
the court held that a point relied on for reversal when stated in the brief
lo be "whether or not the lower court was in error in failing to grant
appellant's motion for a new trial," which motion contained 12 grounds,
was so general as not to require consideration by the court. Doubtless the
court would have passed on the proposition if appellant had "pin-pointed"
the ground which appellant considered sufficient to show prejudicial error.
Motions for new trial are usually based on some alleged error occur-
ing at trial and under such circumstances it is the error occurring at trial
that should be assigned as error and argued as a point relied on for re-
versal, and it is well to show that the error was again presented by motion
for new trial, when such is the case.
X
REVIEW
Grounds for decision below not controlling. Where the order appealed
from did not specify grounds or basis for order, the supreme court will
consider it under its settled practice to affirm a decree of the lower court,
even though based on erroneous ground, if its result is justified on any
other ground appearing in 'the record. 47
Extent of review. On appeal, the reviewing court does not decide the
case based upon how such court would have decided the case had the
45. 90 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1956).
46. 91 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1946).
47. Petition of Freeman, 84 So.Zd 544 (Fla. 1956).
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court heard the original testimony, but only decides whether there was
sufficient evidence in record to justify the lower court's decision.48
No presumption. The reviewing court will indulge in no presump-
tion of irregulatrityj 0 but where error is made to appear, the injury will
be presumed to follow., However, the circumstances shown may have
the effect of overcoming the presumption.
Motion to affirm under supreme court rule 38. In Joseph T. Miller
Construction Co. v. Borak,51 it was held that a motion to affirm under
supreme court rule 28 would be granted only when "from a consideration
of the record and the briefs and oral arguments * * * in support of the
motion there are no substantial errors," and that the motion must
affirnatively make a showing to that effect. Furthermore it was held
in Owensby v. City of Quincy,52 the court would "not consider it appropriate
to file a motion to affirm judgment in a case . . .wherein it is necessary
for this court to examine the entire transcript and to consider the case as
fully as would be ultimately necessary for disposition of the matter" and
the case should follow its regular course on appeal; and in Cooksey v.
Zimmerman"' it was held that the motion to affirm must show clearly the
matter on which it is based; that when an appeal was presented for review
and contained only questions of fact, and no substantive question of law
the motion to affirm would be granted.
XI
DISMISSAL
Dismissal for tardy filing of record, not required. After a timely ap-
peal from probate court, mere delay by the county judge of five months
in transmitting the original records to the circuit court was not a sufficient
ground to sustain appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal; no request for
earlier transmission appears to have been made. 4 It is a legal maxim that
an act of the Court shall prejudice no man," actus curide neminem gracabit.
Dismissal for mootness. The appellate court will dismiss the appeal
where appellant showed the litigation to be moot and the adverse party
had not challenged the decree appealed from by cross assignments of errors.55
Common-law certiorari, discretionary, not obligatory. "Common-law
certiorari is a discretionary writ and ordinarily will not be issued by this
48. Brenner v. Smullion, 84 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1955).
49. Reinhard v. Bliss, 85 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1956); First Atlantic Bank of Daytona
Beach v. Cobbett, 82 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1955).
50. 94 So.2d 854 a, 1957).
51. 82 So.2d 147 I. 1955)
52. 84 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1955).
53. 85 So.2d 593 (Vla. 1955).
54. In re Kreck's Guardianship, 85 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1956).
55. Bahia Mar Caterers, Inc. v. Ft. Lauderdale, 85 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1956).
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court to review interlocutory orders in a suit at law, since such errors as
are made may be corrected on appeal. It is only in exceptional cases,
such as those where the lower court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or where interlocutory order does not conform to the essential require-
ments of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout the
subsequent proceedings for which the remedy by appeal will be inadequate,
that this court will exercise its discretionary power to issue the writ."56
XII
CERTIORARI
Grounds for granting common law certiorari. In Huie v. State. T the
court reiterated the oft-repeated standard governing the granting of a com-
mon law writ of certiorari:
Our consistent position has been that it is only in a case where
it clearly appears that there has been a departure from the essential
requirements of the law and in addition thereto that there is no
full, adequate and complete remedy by appeal after final judgment
available to the petitioner in certiorari that we will ever consider
granting a writ of certiorari to review an interlocutory order in a
law action. See Wolf v. Industrial Supply Corp., Fla., 1952, 62
So.2d 30. In the case before us an appeal from a final judgment
would afford full, adequate and complete relief.
In Kaufman v. King 8 the court in following the standard enunciated
in the Huie case granted a common law writ of certiorari and quashed
an order denying a motion for a change of venue, when the motion should
have been granted, on the ground that the trial judge "departed from the
esesntial requirements of the law."
Circuit court judgment affirming judgment of civil court of Record;
reviewable by common law writ of certiorari. Hilkmeyer v. Latin American
Air Cargo Expeditors9 held that when circuit court on appeal affirms
a judgment of the civil court of record such judgment is reviewable by the
supreme court by the common law writ of certiorari and not by appeal
and, as stated in Nation v. State10 the common law writ will be issued
under the following circumstances:
The common-law writ of certiorari issues, not to serve the purpose
of an appeal, or to give an aggrieved party a second appeal, but to
cause the record of an inferior court to be brought up in order
that a superior court may determine from the face of the record
whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not
56. Kauffman v. King, 89 So,2d 54 (Fla. 1956).
57. 92 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1957).
58. See Note 56 sutra.
59. 94 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1957).
60. 155 Fla. 858, 22 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of law.
. . . The writ being thus limited in function, the subject matter
of a suit that has been tried in a court of competent jurisdiction
and thereafter reviewed in an appropriate appellate tribunal will
not be reinvestigated, tried and determined upon the merits gen-
erally when brought here by certiorari.
Judgment of reversal and remand not final judgment for purposes of
certiorari. Where the circuit court on appellate review reverses a summary
judgment of the civil court of record and remands the case to the lower
court for a jury trial, it is not a sufficient basis for a common law writ of
certiorari. Such action by the circuit court held not to constitute a final
judgment."
Common law certiorari for review of order of transfer to another court.
The common law writ of certiorari is an appropriate method of determining
whether there has been a departure from the essential requirements of
the law when the court enters an order transferring a case from the circuit
court to the civil court of record as authorized by rule of civil procedure
1.39(b).
6 2
Time limitation for petitioning for common law writ of certiorari;
statutory limitation of thirty days or court rule limitation of sixty days, which
governs? In denying a motion to quash a petition for certiorari on the ground
that the petition to review a judgment of the circuit court affirming the judg-
ment of the civil court of record in Drahota v. Taylor Construction Co. 63
the court held that supreme court rule 22 enlarging the time limitation
to sixty days governed. The court stated:
The contention of respondent on its motion to quash is there-
fore without merit, for we have repeatedly held that the time within
which to petition for common-law certiorari cannot be limited by
statute to a period of 30 days after the judgment of the circuit
court."'
The court has generally held that the statutory limitation of thirty
days contained in section 33.12 of the Florida Statutes was of no effect
but that its sixty day limitation was effective. 5
Statute of limitations substantive or procedural; within or without
the rule making power. Scope of rule making power. An interesting case
on this point is found in Perry Y. Allen,68 which involved rule 25 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
61. Feiner v. Sun Ray Drug Co. of Fla., 86 So.2d 891 (Fla. 1956).
62. Tantillo v. Miliman, 87 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1956).
63. 89 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1956).
64. Warshaw.Seattle, Inc. v. Clark, 85 So.2d 623, 625 (Fla. 1956); Brinson v.
Tharin, 99 Fla. 696, 127 So. 313 (1930); Palmer v. Johnson Const. Co., 97 Fla. 479,
121 So. 466 (1929). And see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mack, 64 So.2d 304 (Fla.
1952); Wyman v. Nussbaum; 159 Fla. 813, 32 So.2d 824 (1947).
65. See Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Mack supra note 63.
66. 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
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"(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court within 2 years after the death may order substitution of
the proper parties. If substitution is not so made, the action shall
be dismissed as to the deceased party. .. "
The district court dismissed the action and denied the plaintiff's
motion to substitute the administrator of the deceased defendant, applying
the quoted language as mandatory. But the court of appeals reversed,
holding; "For the substantive law of limitations on the rights of substitution
we must look to the general law, federal or state, governing such matters."
In holding that the Supreme Court of the United States was not
competent to place an absolute time limit upon the assertion of a right,
the opinion in the Perry case07 relative to rule making states:
We are unable to agree with the position of appellee that 'Rule
25(a) operates . . . as a statute of limitations upon revivor
A 'statute' must, under well settled principles and as the
word connotes, be the act of a legislative body. The placing of an
absolute time limit upon the assertion of a right goes to the
substance of the right even though such an Act is catalogued as
relating to remedy alone. Such a limitation may be placed solely
by the legislature and is beyond the competence of a court exercising
its power to formulate rules of procedure. The Supreme Court
spelled out its own concept of the rule-making power many years
before the steps culminating in the federal rules of civil procedure
had their inception. Washington Southern Navigation Co. v. Balti-
more and Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U. S. 629, 635 (1924).
'The function of rules is to regulate the practice of the court
and to facilitate the transaction of its business. This function
embraces, among other things, the regulation of the forms, opera-
tion and effect of process; and the prescribing of forms, modes and
times for proceedings. Most rules are merely a formulation of the
previous practice of the courts. Occasionally, a rule is employed
to express, in convenient form, as applicable to certain classes of
cases, a principle of substantive law which has been established
by statute or decisions. But no rule of court can enlarge or restrict
jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive
law. . . .'" [Emphasis added.I
For an interesting case touching on the distinction between substantive
and procedural law in respect to a statute of limitations see Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co."' where Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 3 specifying the manner of commencement of a suit in the
federal district courts was in conflict with a state statute specifying that for
purposes of limitations of actions, the suit was to be commenced when the
process is served.
67. Ibid.
68. 337 U.S. 530 (1946).
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Effect of denial of petition for certiorari. In Collier v. Homestead9
the court in denial of a petition for certiorari to review an interlocutory
decree stated: "this denial of the petition for certiorari shall not be con-
strued as passing on any of the issues in the litigation" but made no refer-
ance to Hamel v. Danko,70 holding to the contrary. Doubtless the Danko
case was not intended to be overruled. The Danko case held that "certiorari
denied" has the effect of "decree affirmed."
The Danko case was adhered to in Joseph T. Miller Construction Co.
v. Borak,71 when the court reaffirmed dictum in Hunter v. Tyner7 2 to the
effect that a denial of certiorari "was an adjudication of the propriety of
the order involved and it could not again be questioned in this appeal" i.e.
a negative act was positive in effect.
Denial of petition for common law certiorari, not an affirmance. The
mere denial of a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari is not to
affirm the order or judgment of which review is sought. Ruth v. United
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,73 Contra when on petition for certiorari in equity
for review of interlocutory order or decree Hamel v. Danko,74 but application
of this latter doctrine is obviated by the new rules effective July 1, 1957.
See Florida appellate rule 4.2. Denial of a petition for a common law
certiorari is to be distinguished from petition for certiorari under court rule.7 5
Petition for certiorari, reasons for granting, argument in support of. In
seeking a common law writ of certiorari, to review the award of the
Industrial Commission in a Workmen's Compensation case, pursuant to
Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co.," cite the court held in the case of Moses v.
R. H. Wright & Son, Inc.,17 that the "cause and reasons relied in for
granting the writ" exacted by supreme court rule 22, correspond and are
analogous to "assignments of error on appeal." The Moses case further
held that it was inappropriate for the petitioner to consolidate his petition
and brief in support thereof in one document since such procedure violates
supreme court rules 16, 22 and 36 subdivision 6 and (e), and that the
petition and brief in support thereof should be separated documents; and
that the petition should contain an appendix of the material parts of the
record in conformity with supreme court rule 16, subdivision 4, and rule 36,
subdivision 6. The petitioner in the Moses case was doubtless influenced by
69. 81 So.2d 201 (Pa. 1955
70. 82 So.2d 321 Fla. 1955)
71. 82 So.2d 147 (Pa. 1955).
72. 151 Fla. 707, 10 So.2d 492 (1942).
73. 83 So.2d 769 (Pa. 1955).
74. See note 69 supra.
75. Ibid.
76. 69 So.2d 659 (P2, 1954).
77. 90 So.ld 330 (Fa. 1956).
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the new rules of the Supreme Court of the United States wherein rule 23
provides:
"1. The petition for certiorari shall contain in the order herein
indicated .
(c) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms
and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail * * *
3. All contentions in support of a petition for certiorari shall bc
set forth in the body of the petition, etc."
